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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 03-3709
IN RE: DAVID C. DICKSON, III,
                                            Debtor
DAVID C. DICKSON, III,
v.
ELIZABETH J. TINDALL
                                    David C. Dickson, III,
                                                  Appellant
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(Dist. Court No. 4:03-CV-731)
District Court Judge: Hon. John E. Jones, III
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 19, 2005
Before: ALITO, MCKEE, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: March 8, 2005)
2OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM:
As we write only for the parties involved, we will not restate the evidence below. 
We find the Appellant David Dickson’s arguments to be without merit and affirm the
District Court’s order.
David Dickson filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, seeking to discharge an obligation to make monthly payments to his former
wife, Elizabeth Tindall, in the amount of $1,900.00.  The Bankruptcy Court, however,
held that the payments were alimony and therefore non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C.
§523(a)(5)(B), and the District Court affirmed.  In this appeal, Dickson argues that the
payments were not in the nature of alimony.  This inquiry turns on the parties’ intent at
the time of the agreement, and we review the Bankruptcy Court’s finding for clear error. 
In Re: Gianakas, 917 F.2d 759, 761-62 (3d Cir. 1990).
Before proceeding to his substantive argument, Dickson contends that the District
Court committed legal error by not discounting Bankruptcy Court Judge Thomas’s
findings of fact on the grounds that Judge Thomas decided the case based on a transcript
of a hearing conducted by Judge Woodside, who passed away before deciding the case. 
However, Dickson was given the opportunity to have the case reheard by Judge Thomas,
but he consented to a decision on the record.  Furthermore, Judge Thomas’s decision did
Mr. Dickson’s arguments based on settlement negotiations and other surrounding1
circumstances can not be considered on appeal because they rely on documents not in the
record.  See FED. R. APP. P. 10(b)(2).
3
not rest on any determination of witness credibility.  Under these circumstances, there is
no basis for giving the findings of the Bankruptcy Court less deference merely because,
by mutual consent of the interested parties, the case was decided on the record.
The question of whether Dickson’s obligation to make monthly payments to
Tindall is properly characterized as alimony depends on whether the parties intended to
arrange for Tindall’s support or intended a property settlement unrelated to support.  See
In Re: Gianakas, 917 F.2d at 762.  “That intent can best be found by examining three
principal factors”: (1) the language and substance of the agreement in the context of
surrounding circumstances, (2) the parties’ financial circumstances at the time of the
settlement, and (3) the function served by the obligation at the time of the divorce.  Id.
Here, the language creating the debt expressly states that the payments to Tindall
constitute alimony.  Dickson argues that this language was used solely because alimony
payments are tax-deductible and that both parties actually intended for the payments to be
a division of marital property.  In support of this argument, Dickson cites the wording of
the clause dividing marital property, which indicates that this division was only a “partial
settlement.”  From this language, Dickson infers that the monthly payments labeled
“alimony” constituted the remaining element of that division.   Although we appreciate1
Dickson’s argument, we cannot say that the language in question forecloses the contrary
4reading adopted by the Bankruptcy Court.
The parties’ financial circumstances at the time of settlement support the finding
that the payments were intended to allow Tindall to support herself.  At the time, Tindall
was unemployed and lacked a college degree whereas Dickson fully expected that his
profitable practice would continue to provide him with ample income.  Although the total
value of the settlement is generous given that the marriage lasted only six years and the
couple did not have any children, the Bankruptcy Court considered these facts in light of
the couple’s lifestyle during marriage.  The conclusion that Tindall required the money to
maintain that lifestyle was not clearly erroneous given her limited ability to earn money.
Lastly, the function served by the payments at the time of the divorce suggests that
the parties intended Tindall to use the money to support herself.  Dickson acknowledges
that the amount of each monthly payment corresponded to the mortgage payment on the
marital home.  Both the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court found that these
payments allowed Tindall to pay the mortgage and remain in the marital home.  Dickson’s
argument that the terms of the agreement did not require Tindall to use the payments to
pay the mortgage does not require a finding that the money was not intended for Tindall’s
support.
For the above reasons, we affirm the finding that the payments are in the nature of
alimony and therefore non-dischargeable.
